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Abstract
Experiments are commonly thought to have epistemic privilege over simulations. Two ideas 
underpin this belief: First, experiments generate greater inferential power than simulations, and 
second, simulations cannot surprise us the way experiments can. In this paper I argue that neither 
of these claims is true of experiments versus simulations in general. We should give up the 
common practice of resting in-principle judgments about the epistemic value of cases of 
scientific inquiry on whether we classify those cases as experiments or simulations, per se. To the 
extent that either methodology puts researchers in a privileged epistemic position, this is context-
sensitive. 
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Abstract
Experiments are commonly thought to have epistemic privilege over simulations. Two ideas 
underpin this belief: First, experiments generate greater inferential power than simulations, and 
second, simulations cannot surprise us the way experiments can. In this paper I argue that neither 
of these claims is true of experiments versus simulations in general. We should give up the 
common practice of resting in-principle judgments about the epistemic value of cases of 
scientific inquiry on whether we classify those cases as experiments or simulations, per se. To the 
extent that either methodology puts researchers in a privileged epistemic position, this is context-
sensitive. 
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1. Experiment versus Simulation
Scientific practice in the twenty-first century is increasingly blurring the lines between 
experiment and simulation. While it was once common for individual scientists, laboratories, or 
even entire subfields to focus on only one of these methodologies, experimental and 
computational methods are now increasingly combined. This has led to new ways to do science, 
as well as opportunities to reexamine the roles that experiment and simulation play in scientific 
inquiry, and their changing natures in practice. These trends are reflected in increased attention 
from philosophers of science to experimentation (e.g., Franklin 1990; Hacking 1983; Radder 
2003; Weber 2004), to simulation (e.g., Humphreys 2004; Weisberg 2013; Winsberg 2010), and 
to their methodological and epistemic points of convergence and contrast (e.g., Barberousse et al. 
2008; Guala 2002; Morgan 2005; Morrison 2009; Parker 2009; Peck 2004; Peschard 2012; 
Winsberg 2009). 
 This paper contributes to that discussion by challenging a widespread idea that the 
difference between experiment and simulation tells us something, in principle, about epistemic 
value. There is a pervasive view among philosophers and historians of science, and scientists 
themselves, that experiments have epistemic privilege over simulations. That is, they allow us to 
make better inferences about the natural world, or generate more reliable scientific knowledge. 
A number of people have recently put this kind of idea in writing. For example: “[Simulation’s] 
utility is debated and some ecologists and evolutionary biologists view it with suspicion and even 
contempt” (Peck 2004, 530); “simulations are supposed to be somehow less fertile than 
experiments for the production of scientific knowledge” (Guala 2002, 4); and “the intuition of 
[non-economic] sciences and philosophy is that experiment is a more reliable guide to scientific 
knowledge” (Morgan 2005, 326). 
 All of scientific inquiry involves engaging with some object of study—a model, a 
physical system in the laboratory or field, or a combination of these—to learn about some target 
of inquiry. The methodological distinction between experiment and simulation is certainly 
important for making judgments about epistemic value. But I argue that this is the case only in a 
context-sensitive way, not as a generalization across science. The experiment/simulation 
distinction should not be used as a basis for in-principle judgments about epistemic value.
 Before proceeding, some clarification of what is meant by ‘simulation’ is in order. Much 
of the literature on experiment versus simulation focuses on computer simulation: studies of 
computational models with some dynamic temporal element. But there is another, broader 
understanding of ‘simulation’ where the object of study in question could be any kind of model: 
mathematical, computational, or concrete (physical). Simulations in this broader sense are taken 
to include studies of computer models, model organisms in laboratories, and model airplanes in 
wind tunnels. Discussions of the relationship between experiment and simulation in the literature 
have focused sometimes on computer simulation (Humphreys 2004; Morrison 2009; Parker 
2009; Peck 2004) and sometimes on simulation in the broader sense (Guala 2002; Morgan 2005, 
320; Winsberg 2009, 2010). I highlight this contrast upfront because being clear about which 
sense of ‘simulation’ is at stake matters. In particular, I do not believe that there are any clear 
methodological or epistemic distinctions to be drawn between experiment and simulation in the 
broader sense.
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 Experiments are thought to have two epistemic virtues that give them a privileged status 
over simulations. First, they generate greater inferential power, or external validity: 
Experimenters are in a better position to make valid claims about their targets of inquiry in the 
natural world. Second, experiments are a superior (or, the only) source of productive surprises or 
genuinely novel insights. I argue that both of these claims are mistaken as generalizations. To the 
extent that the difference between experiment and simulation carries epistemic weight, this 
weight is context-sensitive; the mere fact that a case of scientific inquiry counts as an experiment 
or a simulation is no indication of its epistemic value. There is a lot of important work to be done 
in understanding what grounds and validates inferences from objects of study to targets of 
inquiry in the natural world. Focusing on whether to classify cases as simulations or experiments, 
per se, muddies the waters of that task.
 In arguing that there is no in-principle difference in epistemic value between experiments 
and simulations, I am not challenging the idea that, within the context of a particular research 
area, there might be good reasons to think that experiments have epistemic privilege over 
simulations or vice versa. Furthermore, I am not challenging the idea that experiments have 
priority over computer simulations in the greater picture of what fundamentally grounds 
scientific knowledge. We know how to do good computer simulations precisely because we have 
gained knowledge about the world through observation and experiment. In the grand scheme of 
things, empirical data is fundamental for answering scientific questions about the natural world. 
But people often seem to blur the lines between this general empiricist claim and a separate 
issue, namely, which methodology, now, will generate better scientific knowledge. This is the 
target of my objection: The kind of thinking that goes into claims about experiments’ general 
superiority, like those cited above, or claims that a case of research is less epistemically valuable 
because “it’s only a simulation.”
2. Inferential Power and Materiality
Belief in the epistemic privilege of experiments over simulations is often grounded in ideas about 
their relative inferential power. In particular, the idea is that experiments lead to better inferences 
about natural systems or phenomena than simulations do1 (this is sometimes referred to as the 
issue of external validity). This difference has to do with the relationship between objects of 
study and targets of inquiry. When a researcher studies one system intending to make inferences 
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1 A number of people have also argued versions of the claim that (at least some kinds of) 
simulations are experiments (e.g., Barberousse et al. 2008; Morrison 2009; Parker 2009; Peck 
2004). This often takes the form of arguing that simulations allow us to achieve methodological or 
epistemic goals regarded as characteristic of experiments, such as actively intervening in an object 
of study or testing causal claims, and thus that simulations deserve to be thought of as 
epistemically on a par with experiments. This is a different sort of point from the one I am 
addressing here, but it still subscribes to the idea that judgments about epistemic value hinge on 
categorizing cases of as simulations or experiments (with experiments getting the upper hand). 
That is precisely the core idea I am objecting to here.
about another, the former is her object and the latter is her target. These terms gives us a useful 
neutral language for discussing views on experiment versus simulation.2
 Judgments about experiments’ privileged status are often driven by the intuition that 
experimental objects of study have a privileged link to targets in the natural world in virtue of 
their shared materiality. Winsberg nicely describes this as “the suspicion (or conviction) [that] 
the experimenter simply has more direct epistemic access to her target than the simulationist 
does” (2010, 55). Morgan (2005) and Guala (2002) have argued that material object–target 
correspondence is a defining feature of experiments, and that this correspondence is responsible 
for experiments’ advantage over simulations in terms of inferential power. I will call this shared 
view of theirs the materiality thesis.3 Guala puts it in terms of experiments’ objects having “deep, 
material” correspondence to their targets, while simulations’ objects have only “abstract, formal” 
correspondence to their targets. Morgan puts it in terms of experiments’ objects “replicating” or 
“reproducing” parts of the world, while simulations’ objects only “represent” parts of the world. 
These authors cite examples of experiments in economics and psychology to support their points: 
Experimental objects of study (in those cases, humans) are the same kind of thing in the 
laboratory and outside the laboratory. Experiments are thus supposed to have greater inferential 
power in virtue of their objects of study being “made of the same stuff as the real 
world” (Morgan 2005, 322); as Morgan puts it, “[T]he fact that the same materials are in the 
experiment and the world makes inferences to the world possible if not easy... the shared 
ontology has epistemological implications. We are more justified in claiming to learn something 
about the world from the experiment because the world and experiment share the same 
stuff” (323).4
 This view lines up with the above-mentioned intuition: Experimental inquiry gets us 
closer to the natural world because experimental objects are samples, instantiations, or 
reproductions of their targets; simulations, in contrast, have as their objects (only) models of 
their targets. As Morgan puts it, “on grounds of inference, experiment remains the preferable 
mode of enquiry because ontological equivalence provides epistemological power” (2005, 326).
 There is certainly some truth in the intuition behind the materiality thesis. Experimenting 
on an actual sample or physical approximation of a target in the natural world is often the best 
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2 I am using these terms in this way following Winsberg (2009) and others. It is important to 
clarify this usage because people have used the word ‘target’ in different ways: usually to refer to 
what I call the target here, but occasionally to refer to what I call the (experimental) object here 
(Peschard 2012; Winsberg 2010, 31, 35), which can get confusing.
3 Harré (2003) also argues for a version of this thesis, though in the context of discussing 
inferences from experiments, not comparing experiments to simulations.
4 Morgan’s paper is on experiments versus models. I take simulations to be studies of models with 
a dynamic temporal element, and it is clear from the context of her paper that the models Morgan 
has in mind involve being studied in this way (cf. footnote 11 below). So her point here about 
object–target relationships in models applies straightforwardly to simulations. Some people 
define simulation differently, e.g., not as a study of a model but rather as a methodology in 
between modeling and simulation (Peck 2004), but this is the minority view, and not the one I am 
assuming here.
way to get traction on understanding it when we know very little about the target in question, or 
when the relevant theoretical background is minimal. For example, we have relatively low 
confidence (today) in our understanding of how new drug cocktails will work in the human body. 
It makes sense for us to place more confidence (now) in tests on physical proxies, like mice or, 
even better, human clinical trial volunteers, than in a computer simulation of the human body. 
But often is not the same as always; material object–target correspondence is not, and should not 
be thought of as, necessarily the best route to valid scientific inferences. I will return to this point 
below.
 In Section 3 I discuss an example of a research program that could reasonably be thought 
of as an experiment or as a simulation in the broader sense. In Section 4, through analyzing this 
example, I will argue two points: First, we should reject the idea that material object–target 
correspondence is characteristic of experiments and confers greater inferential power on them; 
second, we should stop looking to the experiment/simulation distinction altogether as a basis for 
making wholesale judgments about inferential power.5
3. One object, Multiple Targets: Examples from Experimental Evolution
Experimental evolution involves propagating populations of organisms in the laboratory as a 
means to study evolution in real time. This research area provides a good framework for thinking 
through issues regarding experiment versus simulation because, as I spell out further below, it 
blurs the lines between experiment and simulation in the broader sense. Experimental evolution 
is different from studying evolution in natural populations, because the controlled laboratory 
setting allows for more direct, comprehensive analysis of the populations’ genetic makeup and 
evolutionary history. It is also different from artificial selection experiments, because the 
populations are evolving via natural selection; the researcher does not choose which individuals 
will carry on to the next generation based on any particular trait(s) they possess. Experimental 
evolution commonly uses bacteria as objects of study. They are ideal for a number of reasons: 
They have short generation times, large populations can be kept in very small spaces, and they 
can be frozen and revived, allowing for comparisons and competitions between evolved 
populations and their ancestors (Gentile et al. 2011; Lenski et al. 1991).6 
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5 I agree with concerns that both Parker (2009) and Winsberg (2009, 2010) have raised about the 
materiality thesis; in particular, their points that material correspondence does not always entail 
greater inferential power, and that it is difficult to even make sense of the distinction between 
material and formal object–target correspondence. I am objecting to the materiality thesis in a 
different context than theirs, namely, that of arguing that we should do away altogether with 
relying on the experiment/simulation distinction to tell us anything in principle about epistemic 
value. Winsberg (2010) seems sympathetic to my conclusion, but I am putting the point more 
strongly: It is not just that there are exceptions to the generalization that experiments have 
epistemic privilege, but rather, thinking in terms of such generalizations is the wrong way to 
approach judging the epistemic value of cases of scientific inquiry.
6 See Garland and Rose (2009) and a 2013 special issue of Biology Letters (Bataillon et al. 2013 and 
others) for excellent overviews of experimental evolution.
 A notable example is Richard Lenski’s long-term evolution experiment. Lenski’s research 
group used a single ancestral cell of E. coli to found twelve genetically identical populations in 
twelve identical environments (flasks of minimal liquid growth medium), let them evolve, and 
watched what happened (Lenski et al. 1991; Travisano et al. 1995; Vasi et al. 1994). They began 
this experiment in February 1988; the populations passed the 50,000 generation mark in 2010, 
and are still going strong (Lenski 2014). 
 The initial goal of the experiment was to study these twelve populations to learn about 
the long-term dynamics of adaptation and diversification. Lenski and colleagues have also used 
this same object of study to make inferences about a number of different targets in the natural 
world. I will briefly describe two examples, and then discuss how the differences between them 
put pressure on the materiality thesis.
3.1. High mutation rates
The Lenski populations have been used to study the evolution of high mutation rates over long 
evolutionary time scales. Most new mutations are deleterious, which intuitively makes sense: 
There are more ways to mess something up at random than there are ways to improve it. One 
might expect that in well-adapted populations in unchanging environments, genomic mutation 
rates would stay the same over time or perhaps even decrease. In just three of the twelve Lenski 
populations, the opposite happened: Their genomic mutation rates increased by two orders of 
magnitude after 10,000 generations. The explanation for how this happened involves mutator 
alleles, which raise the genomic mutation rate by inhibiting mechanisms like DNA mismatch 
repair or proofreading. Sniegowski and colleagues (1997) discuss how mutator alleles arise 
spontaneously, by mutation, and then hitchhike to high frequencies7 in the experimental 
populations, which is possible because those populations are completely asexual. 
 From this point about high mutation rates evolving in three of the laboratory populations, 
the authors make an inference about populations outside of the laboratory. They conclude that 
high mutation rates might evolve via the same hitchhiking mechanisms in similar clonal 
populations of cells with high mutation rates in the natural world—in particular, pathogenic E. 
coli and Salmonella (Sniegowski et al. 1997, 704).
3.2. Punctuated evolution
In this second example, a different sort of inference is made from the same object of study. 
Lenski and colleagues used results from their evolving E. coli populations to make claims about 
punctuated equilibrium: the notion that evolution occurs in long periods of relative stasis 
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7 Mutator hitchhiking is a phenomenon whereby beneficial mutations arise in a genome and 
happen to be linked to mutator alleles. Strictly asexual populations do not undergo genetic 
recombination. So if a beneficial mutation is linked to a mutator allele, and natural selection 
favors that beneficial mutation, it will spread through the population in subsequent generations 
and the mutator allele can “hitchhike” along with it, resulting in a population with a higher 
genomic mutation rate.
punctuated by short periods of rapid change (Elena et al. 1996). Punctuated equilibrium was a 
hot topic in contemporary discussions of macroevolutionary trends in the fossil record, notably 
championed by Gould and Eldredge in their discussion of events like the Cambrian explosion 
(1977).
 Over the first few thousand generations of the Lenski experiment, the twelve populations 
of E. coli increased in both average fitness and average cell size (Lenski et al. 1991; Lenski and 
Travisano 1994). In addition to these overall trends, average cell size increased in a step-like 
pattern. In one population it remained stable for the first 300 generations, increased by over 25% 
in the following 100 generations, and then remained stable for another 300 generations before 
dramatically increasing again (cf. Elena et al. 1996, figure 1). This led the researchers to claim 
that punctuated evolutionary trends could be observed on (relatively) very short time scales, 
associated with the rise of beneficial new mutations in the population which rapidly sweep to 
fixation.8 At the end of the paper they conclude with the following claim about natural 
populations: 
The experimental population was strictly asexual, which may have increased our ability 
to resolve punctuated changes. However, any difference between sexual and asexual 
populations with respect  to the dynamic of adaptive evolution breaks down when two 
conditions are met: (i) standing genetic variation for fitness is exhausted, as will 
eventually happen in any constant  environment, and (ii) beneficial mutations are so rare 
that they occur as isolated events. To the extent that  these conditions are fulfilled in 
nature, then the selective sweep of beneficial alleles through a population might explain 
cases of punctuated evolution in the fossil record. (Elena et al. 1996, 1804)
4. Against the materiality thesis
The materiality thesis implies that inferential power is proportional to the degree of material 
correspondence between object and target. To think through what this means exactly, we first 
need to clarify what this correspondence is supposed to consist in. Morgan and Guala refer to it 
in various ways: “material correspondence,” “material analogy, “ontological equivalence,” or 
being “made of the same stuff” (Guala 2002; Morgan 2005). They must of course mean “made of 
the same kind of stuff,” in the sense that object and target are both instances of the same material 
type. But there are various ways to interpret what this means. One (perhaps uncharitable) way 
would be “made of the same material stuff at the most fundamental level.” On this interpretation, 
almost all biology experiments could be said to achieve strict material correspondence, because 
their objects and targets are made of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur. 
 Here is a more reasonable interpretation of “material correspondence:” The highest 
degree of material object–target correspondence would be an identity relation. Certain field 
experiments might achieve this, for example, when they involve studying every individual in a 
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8 The authors are careful to use the term ‘punctuated evolution’ rather than ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’. Still, the paper is written so as not to avoid being interpreted as saying something 
about the much more long-term dynamics of punctuated equilibrium involving speciation events.
small, clearly delimited population in order to make inferences about particular features of 
exactly that population. But this sort of object–target identity is far from the norm in science. 
 The next level of material correspondence would be an object which is a token of the 
same relevant ontological category as the target, at a sufficiently fine-grained level for the 
purpose at hand. When a chemist studies samples of uranium to learn about the properties of 
uranium in general, they are achieving material object–target correspondence in exactly this 
sense. The object is a token of the target’s type at the finest level of grain with which we classify 
the relevant kinds: chemical elements. Further from this extreme would be studying mice to learn 
about humans. Both are living organisms, but they are not of the same type at even close to the 
finest level of grain with which we classify organisms. They are both mammals, but do not 
belong to the same species or even genus. Even further from this extreme would be studying 
plastic models of mice to learn about mice.
 I take this to be the most plausible way to make sense of the idea of degrees of material 
correspondence, and will from here on use the term in this sense: in terms of variations in grain 
of correspondence at the relevant “material” (that is, chemical, physical, biological...) level of 
categorization. Adopting this scheme, were we to endorse the materiality thesis, we should hope 
to be able to at least roughly rank research programs in terms of their achieved degree of material 
object–target correspondence. However, this gets difficult if we try to think through the two 
examples of inferences from the Lenski system in these terms. 
 In the high mutation rates case, it is not so difficult. The inference is from experimental 
populations of E. coli to natural populations of E. coli and Salmonella: The mechanism posited 
for explaining the evolution of high mutations rates in the former might be the same mechanism 
responsible for the evolution of high mutation rates in the latter. There is straightforward 
correspondence, in the sense outlined above, between object and target: E. coli in the laboratory 
belong to the same type as E. coli in nature, at a fine-grained level of classification of biological 
types: species. E. coli and Salmonella belong to the same type at a level which is not as fine-
grained, but still, arguably, significantly fine-grained.9 Thus, in the high mutation rates case, the 
object (experimental populations) and target (natural populations) in question differ in their exact 
genetic makeup and environments, but they correspond materially according to the scheme laid 
out above for making sense of the materiality thesis.
 In the punctuated evolution case there is not such straightforward material 
correspondence. It is not even clear how to go about evaluating it. We know what the object is: 
The same set of twelve experimental populations of E. coli as before. But what exactly is the 
target? How is it classified materially? In this case, the claim was that rare, beneficial mutations 
sweeping to fixation explain the punctuated evolutionary dynamic in the laboratory populations, 
and that this same process could explain punctuated evolutionary dynamics in nature. This claim 
rests on the experimental populations sharing properties of their evolutionary history with an 
arbitrary set of populations, traces of whose evolutionary history are left in the fossil record. 
Those properties, in particular, were (i) displaying a certain macroevolutionary trend, (ii) existing 
in a constant environment, and (iii) having rare beneficial mutations. Note that none of these 
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9 While phylogenetics can get messy for bacteria, E. coli and Salmonella are in any case closely 
related; see, e.g., Fukushima (2002).
properties has to do with what the population is “made of:” its phylogenetic classification, or any 
specifics of its phenotype. How are we to assess material object–target correspondence here? 
Both comprise or once comprised living organisms; that is a start. But the target is not identified 
in such a way that its material correspondence to E. coli can be straightforwardly evaluated.
 Material correspondence is not necessarily characteristic of experimental object–target 
relationships. This case illustrates that nicely because it can be said of the exact same 
experimental object that it corresponds materially to one target, but it is unclear whether it 
corresponds materially to another, or how to even evaluate such correspondence.
 A separate issue, however, is: What conditions would need to hold for the inferences in 
question, from the laboratory population of E. coli to these different targets in the natural world, 
to be valid? In the high mutation rates case, the inference relies at least in part on the object 
corresponding materially to the target, in the sense outlined above. It relies on mutator 
hitchhiking actually being the mechanism responsible for the high mutation rates observed in the 
laboratory populations, and on the reasonability of assuming that the same mechanism could 
explain the same observation in closely related natural populations. Here the researchers seem to 
rely on material correspondence in the way Morgan and Guala had in mind: Identifying a 
mechanism in a physical object of study (experimental populations) allows you to make an 
inference about materially corresponding targets in the natural world (namely, natural 
populations in the same biological/phylogenetic class: asexual pathogenic microbes).
 In the punctuated evolution case material correspondence is not playing such a role. 
There the focus is on evolutionary mechanisms and environmental particulars, not what the 
target populations are “made of” in anything like the material correspondence sense. For the 
punctuated evolution inference to be valid, the population-level mechanisms and environmental 
conditions responsible for the evolutionary dynamics in the laboratory populations would need to 
correspond to mechanisms and conditions responsible for evolutionary dynamics in the relevant 
natural populations. But physical, physiological, or phylogenetic particulars of the populations in 
question are not figuring in to the researcher’s reasons to think that is the case. 
 I agree with Parker (2009) that material object–target correspondence does not 
necessarily mean greater epistemic value. The above considerations establish a further point: It 
does not even follow from the fact that we have a material system as our object of study (that is, 
we are doing an experiment) that material correspondence is doing, or is even meant to be doing, 
the work in validating an inference. If we want to assess inferential power in cases like the 
punctuated evolution one, we need to look somewhere other than success or failure at achieving 
material correspondence.
 The picture is further complicated because proponents of the materiality thesis compare 
experiment to simulation in the broader sense (Guala 2002; Morgan 2005), while its opponents 
have sometimes followed suit (Winsberg 2010) and sometimes focused only on computer 
simulation (Parker 2009). I mentioned in Section 1 that it is particularly difficult to establish a 
difference between experiment and simulation in the broader sense. Here is why. If we consider 
the difference between the two examples from Section 3 from the perspective of the materiality 
thesis, we can generate some puzzling questions. Should we think of both cases as experiments 
because their objects are the same kind of physical experimental system in a laboratory (we call 
the research area “experimental evolution,” after all)? Should we think of the high mutation rates 
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case as an experiment and the punctuated evolution case as a simulation in the broader sense? 
The rationale for this might be that the former takes the object as an instance of some target and 
makes inferences grounded in material (and, in this case, phylogenetic) similarities, while the 
latter arguably takes the object as more of a representation or model, and makes inferences 
grounded in more formal similarities. Or should we think of both cases as simulations in the 
broader sense, because the object in question is a population of model organisms, a kind of 
concrete theoretical model?10
 Plausible arguments could be made for affirmative answers to all three of those questions, 
and people argue about just these kinds of questions; see, for example, discussion in Guala 
(2002), and footnote 10. But if we are interested in accounting for how and why cases of 
scientific inquiry differ in inferential power, these sorts of questions are red herrings. This 
discussion of experimental evolution, and the different kinds of inferences that can be made from 
the same object of study, highlight the fuzziness of the distinction between experiment and 
simulation (at least in the broader sense). Whether we classify a case of scientific inquiry as an 
experiment, a simulation, a hybrid, or explicitly both at once, per se, should not make a 
difference to how we judge its inferential power. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the 
validity of the inferences in the examples discussed above. But if one were more valid than 
another, the right way to think about this would be in terms of specific details of the case and 
how well the object of study captures features relevant to making a good inference about the 
target in question—not in terms of how we categorize it. 
 It does not follow from a case of inquiry being categorized as an experiment that its 
inferential power is (actually or intended to be) grounded in its degree of material object–target 
correspondence. Furthermore, categorization as an experiment or a simulation alone does not tell 
us anything about inferential power. We should not look to the experiment/simulation distinction 
as a basis for in-principle judgments about inferential power. There are certainly particular 
contexts in which experiments put us in a better epistemic position to make inferences than 
simulations. But it does not follow that experiments are always better generators of inferential 
power in principle.
5. Surprise
Even if we agree on the points I have made so far, people still want to say that there is a further 
difference between experiments and computer simulations which affects their epistemic value: 
Simulations cannot surprise us the way experiments can (from now on I will refer to this as the 
surprise claim). The thinking behind the surprise claim has to do, again, with the nature of 
experimental objects of study: While experimenters usually design at least some of their object’s 
parts and properties, they never design all of them, and in some cases they design none of them, 
such as in some field experiments. A simulationist’s object of study, on the other hand, is a 
model: She made or programmed it herself, so knows all of the relevant facts about its parts and 
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10 Some (Frigg and Hartmann 2012; Harré 2003; Weisberg 2013) say so of model organisms, in 
any case. Levy and Currie (2014) have recently argued that model organisms are not (theoretical) 
models.
properties. It is thought that experiments, in virtue of the nature of their objects, can thus surprise 
us in ways that simulations cannot. 
 The strongest form of this surprise claim would be that simulations cannot genuinely 
surprise us at all. More commonly, proponents of the surprise claim have in mind the idea that 
simulations and experiments differ, quantitatively or qualitatively, in their capacity to surprise us. 
Paul Sniegowski puts it in the following terms: “Although surprises do emerge in simulations, in 
general what goes into a simulation is well known and surprises are not anticipated. In contrast, 
surprises and exceptions to anticipated results are fairly common in experimental 
systems” (personal communication; cited with permission). This is supporting the claim to a 
more quantitative difference; arguing for a more qualitative difference, Morgan (2005) says that 
while simulations may be able to surprise us, experiments can both surprise and confound. 
Focusing on examples from experimental economics, she writes:
[N]ew behaviour patterns, ones that  surprise and at  first confound the profession, are only 
possible if experimental subjects are given the freedom to behave other than expected. 
[...] This potential for laboratory experiments to surprise and confound contrasts with the 
potential for mathematical model experiments11  only to surprise. In mathematical model 
construction, the economist knows the resources that went into the model. Using the 
model may reveal some surprising, and perhaps unexpected, aspects of the model 
behaviour. Indeed, the point of using the model is to reveal its implications, test its limits 
and so forth. But in principle, the constraints on the model’s behaviour are set, however 
opaque they may be, by the economist who built  the model so that  however unexpected 
the model outcomes, they can be traced back to, and re-explained in terms of, the model. 
(324–5)
 When we talk about whether and how different states of affairs can surprise us, we might 
mean two different things. We could be talking only about epistemic features in us: our reactions 
to those states of affairs in light of our background knowledge. Or we could be talking about 
features of how the world is independent of us: the properties of those states of affairs 
themselves, irregardless of what any agent knows about them. The distinction between surprise 
and confoundment sounds like purely the former kind, about researchers’ epistemic states 
regarding results borne out in their research. It is the distinction between reacting to (i) 
something going otherwise than expected, but in a way still consistent with one’s relevant 
theoretical background or worldview, versus (ii) something emerging from one’s object of study 
which is sufficiently puzzling so as to spark questioning or reevaluating one’s theoretical 
background or worldview.
 Differences in researchers’ epistemic states, alone, seem like the wrong grounds for 
tracking a distinction between experiment and simulation. We do not want a research program’s 
status as experiment or simulation to hinge only on facts about researchers’ epistemic states; in 
the extreme, that would mean that the same instance of inquiry could count as an experiment for 
one researcher or research community, and a simulation for another. I suggest shifting from 
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talking about only our reactions, to talking as much as possible about sources of surprise in the 
object of study itself.12
 There are (at least) two relevant kinds of sources of empirical surprise. The first is 
unexpected behaviors: surprising states or phenomena in one’s object of study exhibited over the 
course of studying it. The second is hidden mechanisms or causal factors: Sources of surprise 
that in some important sense were “there all along.” These are features of the object of study 
itself, which one was genuinely unaware of prior to studying it. We could talk about hidden 
mechanisms existing in our objects of study at different levels: (i) the individual, molecular, or 
atomic level; (ii) the level of interactions among individuals; or (iii) the aggregate or population 
level. (I remain loose with the wording here because depending on the area of inquiry, what 
exactly we call these levels of organization in our object of study will change. For example, the 
relevant levels in chemistry might range from atomic to aggregate, in ecology from individual to 
community, and so forth.)
 Our background knowledge plays a role in this distinction; it is impossible to talk about 
differences in sources of surprise without relying on some epistemic features of the surprised 
agents. But against the background of relevant knowledge in a given case, the key difference 
between unexpected behaviors and hidden mechanisms is a difference between potential sources 
of surprise which (i) emerge over the course of or at the end of a simulation or experiment, 
versus (ii) were in the object of study itself to begin with. I will discuss these two kinds of 
sources of surprise in turn.
 Unexpected behaviors are found in experiments all the time. A classic sort of example is 
the 2007 discovery of aluminum-42 (Castelvecchi, 2007). Physicists were using a particle 
accelerator to test how many neutrons can bind to an atomic nucleus, and colliding atoms in 
attempts to create magnesium-40, a particular and very heavy isotope of magnesium. They 
succeeded, but ended up creating a significant amount of atomic debris in the process, and when 
they sifted through this debris they were surprised to find aluminum-42, another very heavy 
isotope that nobody had thought would physically exist. The appearance of aluminum–42 was an 
unexpected behavior of their object of study.
 Another example of unexpected behavior is in the high mutation rates case from Section 
3. Three of the twelve populations in the Lenski experiment developed high mutation rates; 
Lenski and colleagues did not expect this to happen, but when it did, they drew on their 
theoretical background to explain what was going on.
 Unexpected behaviors also occur all the time in simulations. Examples abound in the area 
of agent-based modeling. In agent-based models (ABMs, also known as individual-based 
models), individual agents and their properties are represented and the consequences of their 
dynamics and interactions are studied via computational simulation. Common applications of 
ABMs include in ecology and the social sciences, where agents represent organisms and their 
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interactions, locations, behaviors, life history traits, and so forth. Behavior patterns can emerge 
from simple initial conditions comprising agents, their properties, and their interactions, such as 
complex cycles of fluctuation in population size, or flocking behavior (Grimm and Railsback 
2013; Railsback and Grimm 2011).
 One example of unexpected behavior from ABMs, keeping with the theme of studying 
evolving populations, is evolved predator avoidance in Avida. Avida is an ABM in which self-
replicating “digital organisms” compete for resources in the form of CPU memory (Ofria and 
Wilke 2004). Ofria and colleagues discuss a case in which they wanted to study a population that 
could not adapt, but would accumulate deleterious or neutral mutations through genetic drift. 
Digital organisms are perfect for this: Researchers can examine each new mutation as it occurs 
by running a copy of the mutant in a test environment and measuring its fitness. The test allowed 
them to identify agents in the primary population with beneficial mutations and kill them off, 
which would in theory stop all future adaptation. Surprisingly, however, the population continued 
to evolve. It turned out that the agents had developed a method of detecting the inputs provided 
in the test environments; once they determined that they were in a test environment, they 
downgraded their performance, the authors say, so as to avoid being killed. As they put it, the 
organisms “evolved predator avoidance.”13
 It makes sense that simulations and experiments can both involve sources of surprise in 
the form of unexpected behaviors, if we consider their methodological points in common. An 
experiment starts with choosing or designing an object of study and specifying a protocol. A 
simulation starts with the object of study, a model, in some initial state with a set of transition 
rules specifying how it will update to future states. In both cases, a researcher sees what happens 
to her object of study over time. The examples of unexpected behaviors I just discussed were 
cases of subsequent states or properties of the object of study differing in unexpected ways from 
its initial states or properties. There are equal opportunities for this sort of thing to happen, in 
principle, in both experiments and simulations. 
 The extreme version of the surprise claim—that a researcher cannot be genuinely 
surprised by her simulations because she knows everything about them—is plainly false. A 
modeler will often, but not always, know everything about her model’s initial conditions and 
transition rules. A straightforward reason why she might not know everything is when she did not 
write the model herself, and is ignorant of aspects of how it was programmed or how it works. 
But there are more interesting reasons, too. For example, she might write the model in a high-
level programming language and fail to understand all of its low-level details. Or she might 
program the model in a way that leads to its initial conditions having unintended features, or its 
transition rules entailing unintended consequences. Furthermore, very complicated models are 
often written by teams, rather than single modelers (for example, in climate modeling); in some 
such cases, no individual researcher running simulations might be said to understand everything 
about the model’s initial conditions and transition rules.
© Philosophy of Science 2014 • Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) • Please use DOI when citing or quoting
13 One could argue about whether this is the right way to describe what went on here, but that is 
beside the point; the point is that unexpected behaviors can occur in simulations just as they can 
in experiments.
 In any case, knowing “everything” about a model’s initial conditions and transition rules 
does not entail knowledge of its future states. Setting an initial state and deciding which rules 
will govern its change over time does not tell you what will happen—that is why you must run 
the simulation. Similarly, finding out as much as you can about an experimental object of study 
and sorting out all the details of your protocol does not tell you what will happen in the 
experiment. Any study of a system with an initial state and subsequent states has at least the 
potential to surprise us, because it contains potential sources of unexpected behaviors as it 
changes (or fails to change) over time.
 I now turn to hidden mechanisms or causal factors. Unlike unexpected behaviors, these 
are features an object of study already had, which a researcher was genuinely unaware of when 
she embarked on a study. A perfect example is the discovery of transposable genetic elements. 
Barbara McClintock was studying the genetics of maize patterns, trying to figure out what gave 
rise to them, and discovered that the gene regulating the maize’s mottled pattern also made its 
chromosomes break. In the process of examining this breakage, she eventually discovered that 
genes can move from one place to another on the chromosome, with a sort of cut and paste 
mechanism, refuting the earlier belief that genes’ positions on the chromosome are fixed 
(McClintock, 1951). This research earned her the Nobel Prize in 1983. McClintock discovered 
transposable elements over the course of her studies of maize plants, but in an important sense 
she was discovering a hidden feature of the genome that had been there all along, which she 
didn’t know was there—nobody knew it was there. 
 The transposable elements case is an example of a hidden mechanism in the form of a 
molecular-level feature of an object of study. Simulations can also contain hidden mechanisms, 
at least in one sense: at the higher, aggregate level. Here is an example: The ABM Sugarscape is 
a simple model consisting of cells in a grid; every cell can contain different amounts of a 
resource (sugar). The basic setup of the model is that agents populate the grid and with each time 
step, they look around for the nearest cell in their neighborhood with the most sugar, move, and 
metabolize. The simple local rules governing the model can give rise to population-level features 
that look remarkably like the macrostructures we see in societies of living organisms: structured 
group-level movement, carrying capacities, distributions of wealth, and migration patterns. 
Joshua Epstein, who created the model, says the following of these emergent structures:
Now, upon first  exposure to these familiar social, or macroscopic structures... some 
people say, “Yes, that looks familiar. But  I’ve seen it before. What’s the surprise?” The 
surprise consists precisely in the emergence of familiar macrostructures from the bottom 
up—from the simple local rules that outwardly appear quite remote from the social, or 
collective, phenomena they generate. In short, it is not the emergent object per se that is 
surprising, but the generative sufficiency of the simple local rules. (1996, 51–2)
Now, one might think: That’s not a hidden mechanism. You had to run the model to see the 
macrostructures, they were not just sitting there in the initial conditions. That is true, but there is 
something revealing in what Epstein says here, in the italicized last sentence: It is not the 
phenomena themselves that are surprising, but the fact that these simple local rules are sufficient 
to generate them. This object of study which looks very simple has generative properties that one 
would have never known about until studying it. And the interesting lessons in this case come 
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gives us reason to think that simulations can contain hidden mechanisms of a sort.
 The difference between unexpected behaviors and hidden mechanisms is another way to 
articulate the sort of idea I believe Morgan had in mind regarding the difference between surprise 
and confoundment. Namely, there are plenty of situations in which we can be surprised by 
unexpected behaviors, but only in special circumstances does surprise cause us to dig down and 
question what is actually going on with the object of study itself, or realize that we did not know 
as much about it as we thought we did going into the research program. However, unlike Morgan 
I am arguing that neither form of surprise is unique to experiments—though studies of material 
systems arguably put us in a much better position to uncover one form of hidden mechanism, 
namely, the molecular, atomic, or individual-level ones.
 It might be true that experiments in the end can contain a particular form of source of 
surprise that simulations cannot. If so, this is an important point, but it is consistent with my 
overall argument that we should not use the experiment/simulation distinction to make in-
principle judgments about epistemic value. Surprise can be a good thing or a bad thing; it 
depends on the kind of scientific question one is asking. Most of our favorite stories of great 
scientific discoveries involve some element of surprise. Many people are drawn to science 
because of the prospect of discovering unexpected behaviors or hidden mechanisms. But the 
value of surprising results in a given context depends on what we are after. In a strict hypothesis-
testing setting, good inferences come from having shown that we have eliminated sources of 
surprise, in a sense. This is part of the point of having controls. Surprise is certainly valuable for 
scientific inquiry. It plays a very important role in exploratory research, in particular. But it does 
not have any in-principle justificatory power that would make experiments better than 
simulations, even if experiments contained the only sources of genuine surprise (which they do 
not).
6. Conclusion
The difference between experiment and simulation matters for pragmatic reasons. Most often, 
doing an experiment will be more costly than doing a simulation. The supplies, reagents, and 
person hours needed to run a laboratory experiment tend to cost significantly more than running 
a model on a computer. Simulations can allow one to observe an object of study’s dynamics over 
time much more quickly than doing so in a real-time experimental system. 
 This pragmatic advantage can come with epistemic costs. Many people have the intuition 
that it always comes with epistemic costs; this is an important part of the intuition which the 
materiality thesis tries to explain:14 The idea is that studying a model as opposed to a material 
system involves sacrificing realism, and sacrificing realism reduces epistemic value. Again, this 
is a good intuition in contexts where we know relatively little about the features of our target of 
inquiry relevant to designing a good experimental system or model. But science is not always 
operating in such contexts. One example of a context in which there is no such epistemic cost 
associated with simulation is the study of molecular bond angles in chemistry. We know enough 
© Philosophy of Science 2014 • Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) • Please use DOI when citing or quoting
14 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
about chemical bonding to answer questions via mathematical modeling and computer 
simulation about how atomic substitutions will effect the bond angle in a given molecule; for 
example, swapping atoms in the molecular backbone of DNA (as in Denning and MacKerell, 
2011). For answering questions about straightforward atomic substitutions in familiar molecules, 
we would not be in a better epistemic situation were we to carry out the relevant experimental 
manipulation (and it would certainly be far more pragmatically costly). So again, the point about 
the epistemic costs of simulation is a point that holds in many contexts. But it is not an in-
principle epistemic difference between experiment and simulation.
 The methodological difference between experiment and simulation is not purely 
pragmatic. It matters for making judgments about epistemic value—but only in a context-
sensitive way. All of science is about engaging with some object of study to learn about some 
target of inquiry, and very rarely are the object and target identical.15 We should not look to the 
experiment-simulation alone to tell us anything in principle about the epistemic value of cases of 
scientific inquiry. Developing a full account of where we should look instead is well beyond the 
scope of this paper. But I will say a few words in closing about which kinds of considerations 
should go into such an account; in particular, the context-sensitive role that the experiment/
simulation distinction should play in thinking about it. 
 The experiment/simulation distinction is relevant to judgments about epistemic value. 
But we need more information before we can conclude that, in any given context, one 
methodology has epistemic privilege over the other. The kinds of considerations that play key 
roles in our ability to draw such context-specific conclusions include the following: First, how 
much and what we already know about the object and target. When we have little background 
knowledge, a physical sample of our target or a close approximation is often the best starting 
point. In some contexts, we know enough to build reliable simulations precisely because we have 
enough information from the world already. The molecular bond example discussed earlier is 
such a context. Experiments tend to have epistemic privilege when we know very little; this is 
not the case in contexts where we know enough to build reliable simulations to answer certain 
sorts of questions. It is also not the case in situations where studying a physical approximation of 
the target would be unfeasible (such as large-scale climate studies (see Parker (2009)) or certain 
kinds of physics at the nanoscale (see Lenhard (2006)).
 Other considerations include the related issues of (i) the importance of realism versus 
control, and (ii) what sort of object–target correspondence we have reason to believe is most 
relevant to validating an epistemically responsible inference about the target. For addressing 
certain kinds of questions, realism and material correspondence seem paramount. For other kinds 
of questions, they do not. If we are interested, for example, in specifics of the molecular 
mechanisms of mutation in populations of E. coli in a particular environment, this seems like the 
kind of case where material object–target correspondence might matter a lot: We care about the 
physiological and phylogenetic particulars of the organisms themselves, and the physical 
particulars of their environment. Contrast this with cases like the following, in which the goal is 
to understand the relative importance of different evolutionary processes in populations with 
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high mutation rates. In a recent paper Keller and colleagues (2012) discuss computer simulations 
aimed at understanding which processes are responsible when null models of mutation-selection 
balance fail to predict a population’s fitness equilibrium. They explain their choice of object of 
study as follows: “we do not pretend that our model captures any biological system. The property  
that is most appealing is a fitness landscape in which many different biological properties can 
evolve” (2308). In a case like this, control of certain high-level features is paramount, and there 
are a number of reasons to think that studying a material system, like laboratory populations of 
organisms, would put researchers in an epistemically worse situation with respect to answering 
the particular question at hand, namely: When the null models fail to predict fitness equilibrium, 
what sorts of other evolutionary processes might be responsible? This is because they would be 
sacrificing much-needed control for arguably unneeded realism (for example, it would be hugely 
more difficult to identify and measure the fittest genotypes in the population.) This is where the 
kind of intuition underlying the materiality thesis comes in: If we are asking a scientific question 
that relies particularly on physical, physiological, or phylogenetic object–target correspondence, 
experiments are the best route to valid inferences. It is the conditional that is key here: Not all 
scientific questions rely on such correspondence to achieve valid inferences about the target in 
question; in fact, some explicitly have goals that conflict with such correspondence.
 Much more needs to be said to account for how we should evaluate the success or failure 
of scientific objects of study at informing us about targets of inquiry, and the validity of 
inferences from the former to the latter. But in closing, I hope to have given convincing reasons 
why we should not look to the experiment/simulation distinction to tell us anything in principle 
about such evaluations, without looking further. I have shows that two senses in which 
experiments are commonly thought to have epistemic privilege over simulations—inferential 
power and capacity to generate surprises—do not generalize across science. Studying a material 
system as opposed to a computer model does not automatically entail better inferences, or more 
opportunities for uncovering surprises. 
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